REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

CITY OF MAKATI

BRANCH 56

PRISCILA    A.     MIJARES,         ET     AL.,

Plaintiffs,

- versus –                                                             CIVIL CASE NO. 97-1052

ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, ETC.,

Defendant

x——————————————————————/

O  R  D  E  R

Submitted for resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order issued by now deceased Judge Reynaldo M. Laigo, on July 8, 2010, which dismissed the case on the ground that the plaintiffs were bereft of legal standing to sue in behalf of the class claimants filed by plaintiffs.

The defendant filed the Opposition to the afore-said motion.

Upon a thorough examination of the arguments of the parties in support of their respective positions on the incident under consideration as well as the whole records of the case, the Court finds compelling reasons to disturb the questioned order and to continue with the proceedings to the finish.

As gleaned from the records of the case, the issue affecting the legal personality of the plaintiffs to initiate the instant action was not among the following common grounds raised by the defendant via the separate motions to dismiss, respectively filed by its alleged representative and defendant-intervenor, Imelda R. Marcos and its duly appointed Executor, Ferdinand R. Marcos II, thus:

(a)    Plaintiffs   have failed   to comply with the mandatory provisions of Circular

7 (referring to the non payment of the filing fees);

(b)   The Honorable  Court  has no  jurisdiction  over  the  complaint  for it is in the

Nature of a charge against the estate which is cognizable by Branch 156 of the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig City;

(c)    The instant action is not proper for a class suit; and

(d)   The  Honorable   Court  has   no   jurisdiction   over   the   complaint   for   the

foreign   judgment   sought  to   be  recognized and enforced is contrary to law

and jurisprudence and was rendered with evident mistake of fact and law.

Such being the case, the defendant is now stopped from belatedly availing itself of that particular ground (lack of legal capacity to sue) as the same was earlier considered by the Court to have been waived for its failure to set that up in the afore-said separate motions to dismiss upon which the complaint may be dismissed.

2

The procedural laws in point are sections 1(d), Rule 16 and 8, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which respective provides as follows:

“Section 1.  Grounds – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the

Complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on

Any of the following grounds:

xxx

(e)    That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;

xxx”

“Section 8.  Omnibus motion – Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule

9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include

all   objections   then   available,   and  all  objections  not so included shall be

deemed waived.”

By way of a reminder to all the parties, the Court, then presided over by Hon. Santiago Javier Ranada, before acting on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, issued an Order dated  June 1988 which serves as the controlling mandate of the Court in the final disposition of the instant case which reads, thus:

“At the hearing this morning, upon discussions and consultations with the

parties,   the  Court  will  now  proceed to  resolve  the  question  of  lack of

jurisdiction  arising  from  the  alleged  failure  of  the  plaintiffs  to  pay the

correct filing fees.   The other  issues raised in  the motion to dismiss will be

tackled  at  the   trial  on  merits,  if   and   when   the   Higher   Court    will

ultimately rule in favour of plaintiffs’ position.

The  parties are each  given  5  days   from   receipt hereof within which to

submit  a   memorandum   of   authorities   in   support   of   their   respective

positions.”  (Underlining supplied)

Finally disposing of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court, upon finding that the proper amount of filing fees is not P410, the amount paid by the plaintiffs, but approximately P472 million, came up with an Order dated 9 September 1998 which DISMISSED the case, without prejudice and another Order dated 28 July 1999 which denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of its said order of dismissal.

Aggrieved, the plaintiffs, by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, elevated both orders of then Judge Ranada to the Honorable Supreme Court.

On April 12, 2005, the Honorable Supreme Court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The assailed orders are

NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE,   and  a  new order  REINSTATING

Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued.  No costs.”

In that decision, the Honorable Supreme Court made a clear pronouncement in this wise, thus:

3

“One more word.  It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges

that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet,   but presumptive evidence

of a right of the petitioners against  the Marcos  Estate.    Moreover,   the

Marcos   Estate   is  not  precluded   to   present  –  evidence,   if any,  of

want  of  jurisdiction,  want  of  notice  to  the party,  collusion, fraud, or

clear  mistake  of  law  or  fact.   This  ruling,   decisive  as  it  is  on  the

question   of  filing   fees   and   no  other,  does   not  render  verdict  on

the   enforceability  of  the  Final  Judgment  before   the  courts    under

the   jurisdiction   of   the   Philippines,  or   for   that   matter  any  other

issue   which   may   legitimately   be   presented  before  the trial   court.

Such   issues   are  to  be   litigated   before  the   trial  court,   but within

the   confines   of   the   matters   for   proof   as   laid   down  in Section

48,   Rule  39.   On  the   other   hand,   the   speedy   resolution   of  this

claim    by    the    trial   court     is    encouraged,     and    contumacious

delay   of  the   decision  on   the   merits   will   not   be  brooked by this

Court.”

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 8 July 2010 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.

Let this case be set anew for trial on the merits on February 21, and 28, 2012 all at 8:30 a.m.

SO ORDERED.

Given this 2^nd day of December, 2011 at Makati City.

HONORIO E. GUANLAO, JR.

Pairing Judge

xxx(end of document)xxxx

For added references we are also posting two other PDF documents 
related to the case (1) The original complaint filed in 1997 filed in Makati Court 
for enforcement of foreign judgement (2) the UN document on the decision 
of the local court. (click on the titles below)

1997 ROP Enforcement Complaint (00086196)

CCPR DECISION (00031531)

The 5th Circuit issued an opinion today reversing the Texas judge and ruling that the Class judgment in Illinois is valid and can be transferred elsewhere. This negates the effect of the 9th Circuit decision in July 31 2008 holding the judgment expired in Hawaii . It concluded:

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100120-248352/NY-court-takes-hold-of-35-M-Marcos-deposits

NY court takes hold of $35-M Marcos deposits

Philippine Daily Inquirer

Posted date: January 20, 2010

MANILA, Philippines—The New York State Supreme Court has taken custody of the $35-million account of the Marcoses deposited in Merrill Lynch pending determination by the tribunal on who should get the funds, Marcos human rights victims said Tuesday.

Loretta Ann Rosales, chair of the victims’ group Claimants 1081, said their US lawyer, Bob Swift, informed them last week that New York Justice Charles Ramos ordered Merrill Lynch to deposit the funds in the so-called Arelma account with the court.

Rosales added that Ramos might rule on the human rights victims’ claim over the money within the next two months.

“According to (Swift), the New York court has recognized that the human rights victims are first in time to execute on the money and have ordered Merrill Lynch to deposit the money in court,” Rosales said.

“Efforts by the (Philippine government) to delay the proceedings have been rebuffed by the court,” she added.

The victims are claiming the Arelma account in an effort to enforce the historic 1995 Hawaii court ruling that awarded them $2 billion in damages for what they suffered under the Marcos dictatorship.

Despite opposition from Merill Lynch and the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Ramos in November last year ruled that the victims’ claim over the Arelma account should proceed and be tried in his court.

The victims then asked the justice to take custody of the funds while he hears all the parties involved in the case. Ramos agreed despite opposition from PNB and Merill Lynch. Philip C. Tubeza

©Copyright 2001-2010 INQUIRER.net, An Inquirer Company

American counsel for the 9,539 Filipino human rights victims are encouraged by recent rulings in the litigation over $35 million of Marcos assets at Merrill Lynch in New York. The New York Court has recognized that the HR victims are first in time to execute on the money and have ordered Merrill Lynch to deposit the money into court. Efforts by the Republic to delay the proceeding have been rebuffed by the New York Court. No date for a final hearing has been set. If the HR victims are successful, their American counsel will expedite a distribution of compensation to them.

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20091211-241328/PNB-to-appeal-new-US-trial-in-Arelma-case

PNB to appeal new US trial in Arelma case

By Philip Tubeza
Philippine Daily Inquirer

Posted date: December 11, 2009

MANILA, Philippines — The Philippine National Bank (PNB) IS set to appeal a US court ruling ordering a new trial to determine ownership of $35 million in ill-gotten Marcos wealth deposited with Merrill Lynch, according to a Presidential Commission on Good Government official.

PCGG Commissioner Jaime Bautista said the PNB will appeal the decision of New York State Supreme Court Justice Charles Ramos to hear the claim of Marcos human rights victims to the Arelma account in Merrill Lynch, while the PCGG studies whether or not to get formally involved in the case.

“The PNB will file a motion to appeal his (Ramos’) decision while the republic studies its legal options. We have many options here,” said Bautista in an interview.

Pre-trial

Ramos set the pre-trial conference of the case for Dec. 15 but Bautista said that the PNB—which was named a respondent in the case together with Merrill Lynch and the Arelma Foundation—had until Dec. 17 to file an appeal.

PCGG Commissioner Ricardo Abcede said the agency was still consulting with its American lawyers on whether or not the Philippine government—through the PCGG—should get involved in the case.

“We are still studying this because our lawyers advised us that if we attend (the New York hearing), we would be legally entrapped,” said Abcede in an interview.

“If we attend the hearing, we would be submitting to the jurisdiction of that court and casting away our sovereign immunity,” he explained.

Sovereign immunity

Sovereign immunity refers to the legal doctrine that bars legal proceedings against a government without its consent.

The Philippine government in 2008 successfully used this doctrine to convince the US Supreme Court to reverse a lower court decision awarding the $35 million to the human rights victims of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos.

The US high court ruled that when a country asserts a claim to property in the US, and that claim is not frivolous, the dismissal of civil cases involving that property is appropriate when the country decides to assert its sovereign immunity and refuses to join in the proceedings.

But last month Ramos ruled that the claim of the 10,000 human rights victims to the Arelma account should again be heard in court. He said the US high court ruling was issued in a different context and, while it was “informative,” the decision was “not binding on New York courts.”

“Should (the Philippine government) continue to elect not to participate, all other parties to this proceeding should not be forced to forego a resolution as to the disposition of this property… Despite the Republic’s absence, an effective judgment may be rendered,” he said.

The $35-million Arelma account grew from $2 million that was first deposited with Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. in New York in 1972.

Arelma Inc. is a Panamanian corporation believed to have been one of the dummy firms used by Marcos to hide ill-gotten gains.
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http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=100020219&docId=l:815096782&isRss=true

The Daily Record (Baltimore, MD)
June 30, 2008 Monday
NEWS
Legal Opinions – U.S. Supreme Court: June 30, 2008
The Daily Record Staff

U.S. SUPREME COURT

Civil Procedure

Interpleader

BOTTOM LINE: Interpleaders did not lose standing to have a judgment vacated in its entirety on procedural grounds because they did not appeal, or petition for certiorari on the underlying ruling denying them the interpleaded assets.

CASE: Republic of Philippines, et al. v. Pimentel, et al., No. 06-1204 (decided June 12, 2008) (Justices Roberts, Scalia, KENNEDY, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer & Alito) (Justices Stevens & Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part).

FACTS: A class action by and for human rights victims (Pimentel class) of Ferdinand Marcos, while he was President of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), led to a nearly $2 billion judgment in a United States District Court.

The Pimentel class then sought to attach the assets of Arelma, S. A. (Arelma), a company incorporated by Marcos, held by a New York broker (Merrill Lynch). The Republic and a Philippine commission (Commission) established to recover property wrongfully taken by Marcos were also attempting to recover this and other Marcos property.

The Philippine National Banc (PNB) held some of the disputed assets in escrow, awaiting the outcome of pending litigation in the Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court determining whether Marcos’ property should be forfeited to the Republic.

Facing claims from various Marcos creditors, including the Pimentel class, Merrill Lynch filed this interpleader action under 28 U.S.C. §1335, naming, among the defendants, the Republic, the Commission, Arelma, PNB (all petitioners here), and the Pimentel class (respondents here).

The Republic and the Commission asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, and moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), arguing that the action could not proceed without them. Arelma and PNB also sought a Rule 19(b) dismissal.

The district court refused, but the 9th Circuit reversed, holding that the Republic and the Commission were entitled to sovereign immunity and were required parties under Rule 19(a), and it entered a stay pending the Sandiganbayan litigation’s outcome.

Finding that that litigation could not determine entitlement to Arelma’s assets, the district court vacated the stay and ultimately awarded the assets to the Pimentel class.

The 9th Circuit affirmed, holding that dismissal was not warranted under Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commission were required parties, their claim had so little likelihood of success on the merits that the action could proceed without them. The court found it unnecessary to consider whether prejudice to those entities might be lessened by a judgment or interim decree in the interpleader action, found the entities’ failure to obtain a judgment in the Sandiganbayan an equitable consideration counseling against dismissing the interpleader suit, and found that allowing the interpleader case to proceed would serve the Pimentel class’ interests.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

LAW: Under Rule 19(a), nonjoinder even of a required person does not always result in dismissal. When joinder is not feasible, the question whether an action should proceed turns on nonexclusive considerations in Rule 19(b), which asks whether “in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed. ”

The joinder issue can be complex, and the case-specific determinations involve multiple factors, some “substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests,” Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102.

Here, Rule 19(a)’s application was not contested: The Republic and the Commission were required entities. And the Court needed not decide the proper standard of review for Rule 19(b) decisions, because the 9th Circuit’s errors of law required reversal.

The first factor directs the court to consider, in determining whether the action may proceed, the prejudice to absent entities and present parties in the event judgment is rendered without joinder. Rule 19(b)(1). The 9th Circuit gave insufficient weight to the sovereign status of the Republic and the Commission in considering whether they would be prejudiced if the case proceeded.

Giving full effect to sovereign immunity promotes the comity and dignity interests that contributed to the development of the immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480. These interests were concrete here. The entities’ claims arose from historically and politically significant events for the Republic and its people, and the entities had a unique interest in resolving matters related to Arelma’s assets.

A foreign state has a comity interest in using its courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. Its dignity is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without right or good cause. A more specific affront could result if property the Republic and the Commission claim is seized by a foreign court decree.

The Court had not previously considered the precise question presented, but authorities involving the intersection of joinder and the United States’ governmental immunity, see, e.g., Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371, instruct that where sovereign immunity is asserted, and the sovereign’s claims are not frivolous, dismissal must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the absent sovereign’s interests.

The claims of the Republic and the Commission were not frivolous, and the 9th Circuit thus erred in ruling on their merits.

The privilege of sovereign immunity from suit is much diminished if an important and consequential ruling affecting the sovereign’s substantial interest is determined, or at least assumed, by a federal court in its absence and over its objection. The Pimentel class’ interest in recovering its damages was not discounted, but important comity concerns were implicated by assertion of foreign sovereign immunity. The error was not that the courts below gave too much weight to the Pimentel class’ interests, but that they did not accord proper weight to the compelling sovereign immunity claim.

The second factor is the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by relief or measures alternative to dismissal, Rule 19(b)(2), but no alternative remedies or forms of relief have been proposed or appear to be available.

As to the third factor – whether a judgment rendered without the absent party would be adequate, Rule 19(b)(3) – “adequacy” refers not to satisfaction of the Pimentel class’ claims, but to the “public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible,” Provident Bank, supra, at 111. Going forward with the action in the absence of the Republic and the Commission would not further this public interest because they could not be bound by a judgment to which they were not parties.

As to the fourth factor – whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder, Rule 19(b)(4) – the 9th Circuit made much of the tort victims’ lack of an alternative forum. But Merrill Lynch, not the Pimentel class, was the plaintiff as the stakeholder in the interpleader action. See 28 U.S.C. §1335(a).

The Pimentel class’ interests were not irrelevant to Rule 19(b)’s equitable balance, but the Rule’s other provisions were the relevant ones to consult. A dismissal on the ground of nonjoinder would not provide Merrill Lynch with a judgment determining entitlement to the assets so it could be done with the matter, but it likely would give Merrill Lynch an effective defense against piecemeal litigation by various claimants and inconsistent, conflicting judgments.

Any prejudice to Merrill Lynch was outweighed by prejudice to the absent entities invoking sovereign immunity. In the usual course, the 9th Circuit’s failure to give sufficient weight to the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission would warrant reversal and remand for further determinations, but here, that error plus this Court’s analysis under Rule 19(b)’s additional provisions required the action’s dismissal.

N.Y. Court Rules Class Can Seek to Recover Funds in Philippine Abuse Case
(reprint from LA.com /International News)

Daniel Wise

Despite a U.S. Supreme Court decision reaching the opposite result in a similar case, a state judge in Manhattan has ruled that a 10,000-member class can seek to recover $35 million located in New York to satisfy a $2 billion judgment it won in 1996 as compensation for human rights abuses committed by former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos.

“The Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal procedure, while informative, is not binding on New York courts,” Justice Charles E. Ramos wrote in Swezey v. Merrill Lynch (pdf), 104734/09.

Ramos ruled that the class can proceed with a turnover action to recover the funds being held by Merrill Lynch, even though the class has failed to join the action by the Philippine government, which has a competing claim.

Both the Republic of the Philippines and its Presidential Commission on Good Government have refused to come into court, claiming sovereign immunity.

Ramos concluded that they cannot be forced to participate, but nevertheless held that New York’s joinder statute, CPLR §1001, permitted the case to go forward without them.

Two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed a federal interpleader action, started by Merrill Lynch itself, to win authority to distribute the contested funds.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S.Ct. 2180 (2007), the Court held that a federal interpleader action had to be dismissed for failure to join both the government and the commission, finding them to be indispensable parties because their sovereign interest in having their own courts resolve the dispute is “concrete.”

Joinder of a party under both state and federal law requires that it be both “necessary” and “indispensable” to the action.

Both Ramos and the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Philippine entities were necessary parties under parallel state and federal joinder rules.

But applying a complex statutory balancing, Ramos, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, found that the parties were not “indispensable.”

The class action plaintiffs are competing with the Philippine commission to recover funds that can be traced to Marcos, members of his family and top aides.

Robert A. Swift, lead counsel to class, said the Philippine government had resisted the class’ efforts to recover on its judgment at every turn since it was entered in 1995.

“There is mean spiritedness to this,” said Swift of Kohn Swift & Graf in Philadelphia. “The Philippine government doesn’t want thousands of the Marcos regime’s human rights victims to ever receive a cent or peso.”

To date, he added, the class has recovered several million dollars over “staunch opposition” from the Philippine government.

Charles A. Rothfeld, of Mayer Brown, who is representing the Philippine National Bank, an intervenor, said that the Philippines had treated funds recovered from Marcos-era figures as “belonging generally to the government” and dedicated them to public purposes such as agrarian reform.

The good government commission was established in 1986, shortly after Marcos was deposed, to recover “ill-gotten wealth” accumulated by his regime. Since then, it has recovered $1.9 billion, according to Swift.

The class action, which represents persons who were tortured, maimed or killed during the 20 years Marcos ruled the country, won a $2 billion jury verdict in federal court in Hawaii in 1995.

The same $35 million is in dispute in both the interpleader action started in 2000 by Merrill Lynch in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii and the turnover action started by the class plaintiffs this year before Ramos.

The money belongs to a Panamanian corporation set up by Marcos while he was president. The highest court in Switzerland has ruled that the Panamanian corporation was an alter ego for Marcos.

In 2008, a Philippine court ruled that the $35 million at Merrill Lynch should be forfeited to the Philippine commission. The class was denied permission to intervene in the Philippine proceeding.

Earlier this year, the class plaintiffs filed the $2 billion judgment it had recovered under the federal Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 et seq., with the state Supreme Court in Manhattan.

There is no judgment as yet in the Philippine case, and Marcos’ estate is appealing the ruling that the Merrill funds must be forfeited.

PARTY’S ONLY REMEDY

Ramos noted that “dismissal for non-joinder is disfavored” in New York “particularly where, as here, the party seeking relief would be left without a judicial remedy.”

The class, Ramos found, has no alternative forum other than state Supreme Court in which to resolve the competing claims to the Merrill funds.

The efforts of the class to join the Philippine proceeding was rebuffed, he found. In addition, when five class members sought to enforce the Hawaii judgment in the Philippines, their petition was dismissed for failure to file an $8.4 million filing fee.

Even though the class filed a motion to lower the filing fee, Ramos noted, a judgment dismissing the Philippine case was filed five years later without any ruling on the class’ motion. The Philippine court’s handling of the matter was found by the United Nations Human Right Committee to violate a U.N. covenant, Ramos pointed out in a footnote.

“It is certainly the Republic’s prerogative not to participate in this proceeding as a nation entitled to sovereign immunity,” Ramos wrote. But, he added, “Should it continue to elect not to participate, all other parties to this proceeding should not be forced to forego a resolution as to the disposition of this property.”

Even if the Philippine government reverses course and elects to participate in the state turnover proceeding, the class “will likely prevail because it was the first to file a judgment in New York,” said Jeffrey E. Glen, a partner at Anderson Kill & Olick, who has been local counsel for the class in the turnover proceeding.

Ramos granted permission to intervene to both Philippine National Bank and Arelma, the Panamanian corporation that holds title to the assets at Merrill.

Rothfeld, who represents Arelma as well as the bank, said his clients are considering their options.

Daniel A. McLaughlin, of Sidley Austin in New York, represented Merrill Lynch.

http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202435675314&NY_Court_Rules_Class_Can_Seek_to_Recover_Funds_in_Philippine_Abuse_Case

ILL-GOTTEN MARCOS FUNDS

Aug. 12, 2009

In behalf of the thousands of martial law victims, Claimants 1081 welcomes the COA findings disclosing the missing $34.14 million ill-gotten Marcos funds because of PCGG’s failure to submit this to the National Treasury. At the same time, we express our disappointment over the way the government has handled the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos amounting to over an estimated $654 million. All the money was supposed to have been transferred to the National Treasury from the PNB after the Supreme Court finally ruled last July 15, 2003 that the money was ill-gotten.

That $22 million of this amount, which has now grown to $34.14 million, was not submitted to the National Treasury despite a Deed of Release with Quitclaim issued by PCGG four years ago, should have been reported to the public considering that the ill-gotten wealth is intended specifically for the agrarian reform program and for the victims of martial law with the passage of the human rights compensation bill.

What adds insult to injury is the fact that this money, which has obviously been kept out of the National Treasury for litigation of PCGG cases abroad has been reportedly used for trips to Singapore and the U.S. by PCGG Chair Camilo Sabio and friends and relatives to oppose the $1.9 billion judgment of the class suit that the martial law victims had won in 1995.

I had earlier called for the COA to investigate this “hidden wealth” from the ill-gotten Marcos funds which were arbitrarily being used for junkets by friends and relatives of Camilo Sabio who himself has pending cases in the Ombudsman regarding withdrawals from funds of sequestered firms deposited in his personal account. Both Akbayan and Claimants 1081 have likewise called for the suspension of Camilo Sabio as Chair of PCGG. He has no business representing the Republic of the Philippines with cases of graft and corruption involving his acts as Chair of the PCGG.

Now that COA has let the cat out of the bag, we earnestly urge that COA order a full reimbursement by the PCGG of the missing $34.14 million and that this money be placed in the special account for the victims of human rights violations once the bill is passed into law. I had been earlier told by the National Treasury that P10 billion of the Swiss funds is kept intact in a special account but that, until such time the victims have a law passed in their favor, the money cannot be touched.

In this regard, as Chair of Claimants 1081 and in their behalf, I would like to call on Congress to please speed up the passage of the human rights compensation bill which we failed to pass in the 13^th Congress because the House of Representatives did not calendar the bill’s ratification after the Bicameral Conference, ostensibly upon orders from Malacanang.

I had the privilege and honor of talking quite briefly with the President of the Swiss Federal Republic in a reception last night given by the Swiss Embassy in his honor. I was quite impressed with the fact that he said he had repeatedly spoken about the passage of the human rights compensation bill to President Arroyo during his visit. The news in some of the broadsheets seems to confirm the assurance given me by the Swiss President and for this, again we pray and hope that by Christmas our thousands upon thousands of martial law victims will see the light at the end of the tunnel with the passage of the compensation bill into law and its signing by President Arroyo.

Etta Pargas-Rosales

Chair, Claimants 1081

Aug. 11, 2008